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Many health improving interventions in low-income countries are extremely good value for money. 
So why has it often proven difficult to obtain political backing for highly cost-effective interventions 
such as vaccinations, treatments against diarrhoeal disease in children, and preventive policies such 
as improved access to clean water, or policies curtailing tobacco consumption? We use economic 
models of public choice, supported by examples, to explain how powerful interest groups, 
politicians or bureaucrats who pursue their own objectives, or voting and institutional arrangements 
in countries have shaped health priority setting. We show that it may be perfectly rational for policy 
makers to accommodate these constraints in their decisions, even if it implies departing from 
welfare maximizing solutions.
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Foreword 
Amanda Glassman 
If you have $200 to spend on health in a developing country, would you vaccinate 10 
children against deadly childhood diseases or provide AIDS treatment to one woman to 
prevent transmission of HIV to her unborn child? Policymakers routinely face such tough 
budgetary dilemmas with little expert guidance. The reality is that there are many objectives 
and interests competing for limited resources—and in many low- and middle-income 
countries (LMIC), ad hoc processes drive choices that can result in low value and inequitable 
resource allocation. 
Starting with the working group on priority-setting institutions for global health, CGD’s 
global health policy team has worked to aid in the difficult process of assessing costs, 
benefits, and trade-offs of new technologies and to inform decisions on public and donor 
spending. 
We don’t have a full understanding of what prevents a government from making goal-
consequent resource allocation decisions that use technical information such as cost-
effectiveness analysis. The study of politics and political economy, which is fundamentally 
concerned with conflict of interest, is one lens through which to gain greater understanding 
of these issues. With a clearer picture, perhaps we can work with governments to formulate 
strategies to manage competing objectives, demands, and interests—and give donors greater 
visibility into government processes and preferences so they can better align their decisions 
with those of government. 
Unpacking the complexities of political economy of priority-setting in health is important, 
but how do people currently study this topic? The answer is that thus far, we don’t know—
there is no defined framework or method of study. This is why Katharina Hauck and Peter 
Smith’s paper, “The politics of priority setting in health: A political economy perspective” is 
a needed addition in this field. Hauck and Smith examine models of political economy and 
public choice and describe how decision makers react to political realities. It will spark 
discussion and further research among the global health community, and serve as a starting 
point for LMIC policymakers in making sound choices in resource allocation for health. 
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Introduction 
Many health improving interventions in low-income countries are extremely good value for 
money. Simple primary care interventions, for example vaccinations against communicable 
diseases or treatments against diarrhoeal disease in children, and preventive interventions 
such as improved access to clean water, or policies curtailing tobacco consumption are often 
relatively low cost interventions that produce substantial health gains. Where evidence on 
cost-effectiveness is available, many of these preventive and primary care interventions fare 
very well when compared with more conventional healthcare interventions. So why are not 
more public funds invested in highly cost-effective primary care and public health 
interventions? And why in some situations has it been so difficult to implement common-
sense policies such as sewage treatment, or taxes on cigarettes? One may argue that it is the 
poor evidence base that made policy makers shy away from making these investments, and 
that the scientific community failed to produce the kind of evidence that would convince 
decision makers to do the right thing. However, the methods and application of cost-
effectiveness analysis (CEA) of health technologies have reached an advanced stage of 
development (Drummond, Sculpher et al. 2005). There is widespread agreement that the 
principles of CEA represent a valid and feasible approach towards setting health priorities, 
and many countries are seeking to embed the method into their decision-making processes. 
Still, the recommendations arising from CEA are often not implemented as intended.  
We will argue in this paper that it is often the realities of the political decision-making 
process that militate against political backing for common sense health investments, rather 
than the methodological shortcomings of CEA. Although economic evaluation offers a 
powerful rational approach to setting priorities, there may be alternative perspectives from 
which it is rational for decision makers to disregard the recommendations. One major class 
of factors that may explain why strategic decision-makers depart from national or 
international guidance are the wide range of political constraints that necessarily influence 
many decisions. We will discuss whether CEA ignores important elements of the priority-
setting process that impinge on practical decision-making.  
In practice the process of priority setting takes place in a profoundly political context, in 
which numerous influential political interest groups seek to participate. Models of political 
economy describe how decision makers react to political realities, and how priority-setting 
decisions may be influenced by them. They try to explain why the political decision-making 
process fails to generate apparently welfare-improving policy changes. This phenomenon is 
often referred to as government failure, although it can sometimes be better characterized as 
‘realistic politics’. There is surprisingly little research investigating the political economy of 
the health sector. According to Tuohy and Glied (2011) the presence of health care in the 
substantial literature on political economy in economics is “less than proportionate to the 
size of health care in government activities” (p. 58). Hauck, Smith and Goddard (Hauck, 
Smith et al. 2004) and Goddard et al (2006) demonstrated that viewing priority setting from 
a political economy perspective can substantially enrich our understanding the choices made 
in real-life decision-making.  
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Following on from previous research, we therefore consider the various political constraints 
that affect the decision options available to decision makers. We use models of political 
economy to explain why even benevolent social welfare maximising decision makers may 
diverge from the traditional economic evaluation approach, and more broadly, why they may 
discard interventions that are considered welfare- and health-improving. The objective of 
this paper is to collate and discuss evidence from empirical and theoretical models of public 
choice and political economy applied to decision-making in healthcare and public health. 
The models help us move from the normative approach to priority setting, based on what 
should be done to maximize some concept of social welfare, into the realm of positive 
approaches that attempt to understand what happens in practice.  
We examine the following theories: 
• Models of competing interest groups, based on the assumption that powerful interest
groups – for example provider organizations – may seek to skew decisions in their own
favour at the expense of less organized stakeholders.
• Voting models, such as the median voter model, (Ahmed and Greene 2000), which
assert that political decision-makers will seek to develop policies that attract particular
voter groups, in an effort to maximize political support. The implication of this insight
for priority setting is that the size and contents of a public benefits package may be
skewed towards the preferences of key voting groups.
• Bureaucratic decision-making models, which assert that ‘bureaucrats’ may make
decisions in their own interests, rather than the interests of the population as a whole.
• Institutional economics to explain how governmental institutions and more generally the
organisation of the political system influence decisions
• Decentralization and contracting-out to non-governmental organizations, and
implications on provision of public services.
Models of political economy offer different explanations of why the allocation of health 
system resources may differ from that predicted by the naïve economic model. However, 
they all acknowledge that priority setting takes place in a political environment. Choices will 
be to the advantage of some groups and to the disadvantage of others. It is therefore 
important to examine the utility function of those responsible for setting priorities, often 
generally referred to as “the government”, although it may sometimes be important to bear 
in mind the importance of individuals acting within government. A large class of political-
economy models assume that the same behavioural model that can be used to explain 
decision making in ordinary markets can also be applied to decision making in the public 
sector. Public policy makers are not necessarily benevolent maximizers of social welfare, but 
may be motivated by their own self-interest. Firms seek to maximize profits, consumers seek 
to maximize utility, and policy makers seek to maximize political support, or their own 
personal gain.  
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The models further assume that, while policy errors are certainly possible, it is more 
informative to assume that the intended effects of a policy can be deduced from the 
observed effects, especially when such policies persist over time. Therefore not all models of 
political economy necessarily imply errors in priority setting. In acknowledging political 
constraints, we do not of course argue that such behaviour is desirable, or that it happens in 
all circumstances. Individuals have various motivations and we acknowledge that many 
decision makers will act with predominantly altruistic and welfare maximizing considerations 
in mind. Our aim is merely to offer a framework for explaining apparently perverse actions 
on the part of decision-makers. 
Interest groups 
The interest group model demonstrates that some groups of the population are more 
successful in promoting their interests than other groups, and seeks to explain the impact 
this has on priority setting, resource allocation, redistribution of wealth, and even the 
survival of governments. Within health care, small groups with a clearly defined common 
objective – for example, the pharmaceutical industry or patients with a specific disease – 
have lower costs in organizing themselves, securing cohesion and effectively lobbying 
decision makers to their advantage, at the expense of the larger population whose interests 
may be more diffuse and experience higher costs of organizing. Olsen’s (1971) theory of 
collective action suggests that interest groups are able to exert such influences because the 
benefits of action accrue to a narrow, well-organized group, whilst the costs are dispersed 
broadly across a diffuse group. The narrow, well-organized group can effectively monitor the 
behaviour of its members to discourage free-riding. The substantial benefits of legislative 
action to each member further encourage the membership to exert effort to gain legislative 
ends.  
In contrast, the dispersed, disorganized group who will pay the costs of the new legislation 
often cannot even identify the other members of their group, let alone compel their 
participation in efforts to the stop the legislation. Each member of the group will incur only 
a minuscule cost because of the new legislation, so it is not in any individual’s self-interest to 
exert much effort. The theory can explain underinvestment in public health policies; because 
the potential beneficiaries of public health actions are unknown and may not even yet be 
born, public health policies, by design, have no clear apparent constituency to support it 
(Glied 2008).  
The ‘capture’ theory describes interest groups as ‘capturing’ the regulatory power of the state 
to achieve a redistribution of wealth between different groups of the population in the form 
of transfers that may be cash or favours (Stigler 1971). Some interest groups have privileged 
access to information that gives them a comparative advantage. We discuss examples from 
the health sector where powerful minority groups with the interest, the means and the 
opportunity to organize themselves have influenced political decisions to their advantage. 
The literature is moving from a focus on single interest groups to the view that various 
interest groups are linked in shifting alliances and form tightly linked oligarchies or 
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professionalized networks of medical, hospital, and business interests, depending on the 
institutional context (Tuohy and Glied 2011).  
Providers of health services – the health care professions – form a crucial interest group in 
many countries, and governments are often wary of alienating doctors who are in a strong 
position to mobilize opposition to chosen priorities. The performance of all health systems 
relies on a vibrant, well-trained and motivated workforce. If the adoption of certain priorities 
risks alienating key clinical groups, perhaps leading to a collapse in morale, early retirement, 
or emigration, then decision-makers may choose to adopt second best solutions that avoid 
such risks. It is of course a matter of political judgement as to when to accommodate and 
when to confront powerful interest groups. While providers would certainly not want to be 
seen to actively work against the interest of patients, it is unlikely that investments in public 
health and cost-effective care in community settings feature prominently amongst their 
priorities, especially if such investments are made at the expense of curative health care 
interventions in urban areas, or even reduce demand for their services. Health staff may have 
credible threats that can undermine the implementation of policy shifts, ranging from overt 
threats such as quitting the workforce, emigration, or shifting employment from the public 
to the private sector, to subtle non-cooperation and adherence to traditional patterns of care. 
Such alienation may have profoundly important consequences for a healthcare system.  
A central feature of almost all health systems is effective organisation and strict licencing 
regulation of the medical profession. Licensing is defended on the grounds of guaranteeing 
quality standards that are predicted to improve the average quality of service offered by 
practitioners when the entry of less competent practitioners is prevented or when less 
competent practitioners are forced to increase their investments in human capital, e.g. see 
Shapiro (1986). However, it also could be argued that it reduces scope for market entry, 
defends inefficient practices, and leads to practitioner rents, as predicted by the capture 
theory. The social loss due to these negative effects may be outweighed by the social gains 
from a higher quality of service. Reliable empirical evidence that licencing improves the 
average quality of service offered by practitioners is rare, mainly due to the difficulty of 
obtaining accurate measures of practitioner quality (Kugler and Sauer 2005).  
The pharmaceutical industry is another powerful interest group that may favour certain 
health care interventions and drug treatments over others. For example, The Council of the 
Europe Assembly quite openly voiced the suspicion that the pharmaceutical industry 
influenced the World Health Organization’s response to the H1N1 flu pandemic. The 
Council accused WHO of exaggerating the seriousness of the epidemic which resulted in 
public funds being spent on vaccines and antivirals that were never needed, so goes the 
accusation (Taylor 2010). Patient associations have successfully lobbied governments to fund 
drugs publicly, even if there is doubt about their cost-effectiveness, or even clinical efficacy 
and safety, for example the breast cancer drug Herceptin in the English National Health 
Survey (NHS) (Berg 2006). As public choice theory predicts, chronic illnesses with 
comparably low prevalence are at an advantage, for example HIV/AIDS, at least partly due 
to the fact that costs of organizing are lower (McIntosh 1990). Preventive public health 
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interventions are at a disadvantage because there is no clearly defined patient group lobbying 
in their favour, and they have to rely on individuals or groups with altruistic motivation for 
support. There is evidence that FDA drug approval times are shorter for drugs with more 
active and wealthier disease-interest groups (Carpenter 2002).  
Further, governments often prioritize sensitive political issues concerning highly visible 
aspects of health care services, at the expense of investments in public health. For example, 
some countries place a high priority on tackling waiting times for elective surgery, which 
affect a relatively small group of patients. This preoccupation could be interpreted as a 
response by politicians to the more media-friendly interests of waiting patients when 
compared with interventions aimed at the whole population, or large and difficult to 
delineate subgroups of individuals at risk, such as preventive screening or healthy lifestyle 
campaigns.  
Other commercial companies that are driven by economic interests have formed powerful 
interest groups. The tobacco industry adopted various strategies to frustrate highly cost-
effective public health interventions aimed at reducing consumption of cigarettes. Many of 
the strategies came to light only when an extensive library of internal tobacco industry 
documents was released publicly as a result of the 1998 settlement agreement (LTDL 2002). 
For decades before, the tobacco industry successfully pre-empted efforts to limit advertising 
and sale of cigarettes, by publicly disputing evidence that smoking cigarettes damages health, 
half-hearted self-regulation such as the Cigarette Advertiser Code, and public messages and 
advertising that emphasized individual responsibility to deflect blame from the industry 
(Richards, Tye et al. 1996). Some now fear that history will repeat itself by comparing the 
tobacco industries’ strategies with current efforts by the food producing industry to deny the 
contribution of their products, in particular soft drinks and highly processed snack food, to 
the obesity epidemic and to rally against policy proposals such as taxes on soft drinks 
(Brownell and Warner 2009).  
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Interest groups: Soft drink and fast food industries in low- and middle-income 
countries 
Market entry marketing in Burkina Faso 
Advertising for soft drinks in the poorest countries of the world is a deliberate marketing 
strategy of the beverage industry. While most consumers in Burkina Faso cannot afford to 
purchase the beverage, the industry is deliberately raising awareness and liking of the product 
so as to increase sales in the future when income levels increase. Global soft drink and fast 
food companies follow so-called ‘loss leading’ and ‘value’ strategies to encourage 
consumption initially with low prices and small package prices, but then later increase 
package sizes and prices. Fast food companies adapt menus to suit local tastes, and soft 
drink companies seek to increase ‘cold availability’ of their products with heavy investments 
in distribution and refrigeration facilities at local suppliers. Hawkes (2002) provides a review 
of the marketing activities of global soft drink and fast food companies in emerging markets.  
Image source: http://www.infectiousmedia.com/marking-the-case-for-banners 
Employers form an interest group that has traditionally supported cost-effective public 
health interventions if they improve and preserve the productivity of their workforce. 
Historically, investments in the control of diseases in low-income countries were driven by 
the economic interests of colonial countries, and the need to guarantee the health of the 
workforce sent to work there (Hauck and Smith 2014). For example, in Britain in the 1890s, 
the Colonial Secretary Chamberlain was aware that the poor health of the native workers and 
the officials sent to serve in the Colonies was a threat to Britain’s growing empire. Mortality 
among officials in some parts of the world, particularly the Gold Coast of West Africa, was 
soaring and to compensate, salaries were sometimes 100% higher than those of colleagues 
elsewhere. The economic significance of the control of tropical disease led to the 
establishment of institutions and schools of tropical medicine in colonial countries. 
Nowadays, some mining companies are providing free Anti-retroviral therapy to their HIV 
positive employees, sometimes even including their families (AngloAmerican 2008). As 
HIV/AIDS predominantly affects working age adults, companies are possibly motivated by 
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a combination of humanitarian interests and the commercial interest to preserve the human 
capital established in their workforce (News 2002).  
The globalization of economies and increase in trade since the 1980s has strengthened the 
role of institutions that govern the complex international economy such as the World Bank, 
the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization. Like in national 
economies, effective international regimes are required to support the global economy by 
reducing uncertainty, minimizing transaction costs and preventing market failure, although 
international institutions often lack the power to enforce compliance. International 
governmental and non-governmental organizations (IOs) are involved in resource allocation 
decisions and health policies of developing countries. In some key programmes, such as 
childhood immunizations, less than half of funding comes from national sources (GAVI 
2008). 
The assessment of transnational actors is largely optimistic, suggesting they herald an 
emerging global civil society that is assumed to rest upon shared liberal norms and values 
that motivate their action and explain their supposedly benign influence. Cooley and Ron 
(2002) question this view and analyse IOs with a political economy approach and argue that 
many aspects of their behaviour can be explained by materialist analysis and an examination 
of the incentives and constraints produced by the transnational sector's institutional 
environment. They argue that the growing number of IOs within a given transnational sector 
increases uncertainty, competition, and insecurity for all organizations in that sector. The 
marketization of many IO activities -particularly the use of competitive tenders and 
renewable contracting- generates incentives that can produce dysfunctional outcomes. 
Glassman and Chalkidou (2012) point out that health aid mechanisms have done little to 
support countries to make the connection between what is best value and affordable, and 
what is included on public budgets. The authors cite a study by Bump et al (2013) that 
analysed trends in scientific publications. While diarrheal disease burden remained high, 
publications on infant diarrhoea in developing countries rose quickly in the 1980s and 
tapered off in the late 1990s and 2000s. Over the same period, publications on malaria and 
tuberculosis have grown steadily, likely due to donor funding emphasis.  
Ruger (2011) discusses that the current regime of global health governance needs to be 
understood as transnational and national actors pursuing their own interests under a rational 
actor model of international cooperation that fails to provide sufficient justification for joint 
actions to correct and avert global health injustices. She develops an alternative model of 
shared health governance, which aims to provide a framework for various global health 
actors to better promote cooperation that is based on shared ethical commitments. Global 
health payers including the Global Fund, the GAVI Alliance, and the U.S. President’s 
Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) have set up co-financing requirements. This is 
to share financial burdens, support country ownership of programs (Glassman and 
Chalkidou 2012), and ensure greater alignment with national priorities.  
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Interest groups: Topic selection by the National Institute for Health and Care 
Excellence (NICE) 
NICE provides evidence based guidance on the clinical efficacy and cost-effectiveness of 
health care technologies, and is generally viewed as an international leader among such 
agencies, however, the choice of technologies that NICE puts forward for appraisal has 
come under criticism in the past. The Government’s Response to the Health Select 
Committee’s First Report of Session 2007-08 on the National Institute for Health and 
Clinical Excellence stated “It seems to us appropriate that topics are selected for interventional 
procedures, clinical guidelines and public health guidance. It is not appropriate, however, to limit technology 
appraisals to selected, often new and expensive, products. Instead, … , all new drugs should be assessed” (p. 
2 in DoH 2010).  
The concern was put forward that NICE’s focus on acute treatments, in particular 
medicines, could skew NHS spending towards selected new and expensive (NICE approved) 
drugs for acute illness. It was commented that this reflects current trends in drug 
development and drug discovery, where the prevalence of new drugs for conditions such as 
cancer means that many new drugs initially impact on secondary care (p. 4 in DoH 2010). 
The Governments’ Response acknowledged that it may not be feasible to appraise all new 
drugs and treatments, and that a topic selection needs to be in place.  
Department of Health. The Government's Response to the Health Select Committee's First Report of Session 2007-08 
on the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence. House of Commons Health Select Committee, 
Department of Health. CM 7331, 2010.  
Even organizations seeking purely ‘technocratic’ solutions to priority setting by providing 
scientific evidence on the cost effectiveness of interventions (e.g. health technology 
assessment agencies) may risk capture. A problem is to find sources of expert advice that do 
not have direct or indirect links to interested parties; further, the influence of interest groups 
may affect selection of interventions chosen for assessment, although it can also be seen as 
an attempt to increase political support for decisions.  
Voting models 
Many health interventions are targeted at conditions that predominately affect disadvantaged 
groups of the population, and some even have the primary objective of reducing inequalities 
in health. This in itself may imply a need to depart from pure cost-effectiveness criteria, 
which imply an objective of maximizing aggregate health outcomes. For example, the 
median voter model may explain why such health interventions often receive less political 
backing than others that benefit a wider or different spectrum of the population. The model 
focuses on the politician as a maximizer of votes (Hotelling 1929, Anderson 1999). The 
“median voter” theorem shows that in a representative democracy, political parties tend to 
move towards the political position of the median voter in order to secure election. Among 
many other considerations, people also vote on the level of health care services that should 
be provided by the public system. This implies that the level of health spending and its 
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allocation across different types of services will correspond to that demanded by the median 
voter. It may explain why policy makers seek to direct resources towards interventions and 
services favoured by key population groups at the expense of others, notwithstanding the 
apparently reasonable claims of the latter on resources from an efficiency or equity 
perspective.  
For example, median voters are likely to perceive that they or their family benefit from 
screening services for common conditions such as cancers. Therefore, the provision of such 
services is likely to receive widespread support, even if evidence of cost-effectiveness is 
weak, or indeed they might do more harm than good. On the other hand, policies directed at 
the poor may receive less popular support because the median voter does not perceive any 
personal or family need for such services. Even if the latter services are very cost effective, 
politicians seeking re-election may find it difficult to attach high priority to them. Similarly, 
many common healthcare interventions, such as treatment for acute myocardial infarction, 
hip and knee replacements, or cataract removals are likely to be demanded by the median 
voter at a certain point in life. Although a great simplification of electoral pressures, the 
median voter model highlights the importance to any government of obtaining the support 
of crucial electoral constituencies.  
Voting models: The Median voter model 
The graph shows the frequency distribution of political spectrum of voters. The left oriented 
party A and the right oriented party B can maximize votes by moving towards the political 
position of the median voter M because they can be assured of votes on the extremer ends 
of spectrum. Voting models have been extended to situations where there are more than two 
political parties (Hotelling 1929, Anderson 1999).  
Gaining taxpayer support for health policies has high importance for policy makers, in 
particular in many low-income countries with high levels of informal employment where tax 
contributions are concentrated among a relatively small, urban elite. These citizens may often 
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hold disproportionate influence over governments, and tend not to suffer to nearly the same 
extent from the communicable diseases and certain chronic conditions suffered by poorer 
citizens. The interest group model can explain why expenditures are often focused on health 
care services for richer areas or social groups at the expense of preventive and public health 
services for the poor, even where the latter offers greater cost-effectiveness. In a democratic 
system, as the proportion of poor in the overall electorate is relatively large, most tax-
financed health care expenditure would be devoted to illnesses of the poor in order to secure 
support of the majority of voters. However, such a policy choice would imply very large 
financial transfers, through the tax regime, from the rich to the poor. In short, the rich may 
have to make big tax contributions to public interventions that do not benefit them greatly. 
This may lead to resistance amongst the rich, tax evasion, increased collection costs, or even 
emigration. The urban bias is explained in that groups and populations based in rural areas 
may be less informed, less literate, and have an under-developed infrastructure for the 
dissemination of information compared to wealthier groups or those based in the urban 
areas, where access to information resources is better.  
Economic theory of tax compliance predicts that tax evasion should be much greater than it 
actually is, given the low deterrence in most countries - conceptualized as the product of the 
probability of being detected and the size of the fine imposed. The literature alludes to an 
effect known as ‘fiscal exchange’, a psychological tax contract between taxpayers and the 
government (Alm, Jackson et al. 1993). The more governments provide public services 
according to the preferences of taxpayers in exchange for a reasonable tax price, the more 
taxpayers comply with the tax laws. Citizens are willing to honestly declare income, even if 
they do not receive a full public good equivalent to tax payments, as long as the political 
process is perceived to be fair and legitimate (Feld and Frey 2007). The concept of “fiscal 
exchange” has important implications for health care priority setting. In order to limit tax 
resistance of this kind among the rich, the government may feel constrained to include some 
provision for the health care needs of the rich in the essential package of care in order to 
retain the viability of the tax base, even when the associated treatments do not qualify for 
inclusion on strict cost-effectiveness criteria. There is empirical evidence that regional 
distribution of advantaged groups is strongly correlated with access to public goods: for 
example, in India, areas with a high concentration of Brahmans and Christians enjoy better 
access to public services (Banerjee and Somanathan 2007).  
Some voters will have a demand for healthcare that is not met by the contents or the quality 
of the public package, and theory predicts that these are the ones with higher need for 
healthcare, and with higher incomes (Epple and Romano 1996). Because the income 
elasticity of health care is positive, individuals with higher income have greater willingness 
and ability to pay for healthcare, for example, either out-of-pocket or via supplemental 
private health insurance if this is allowed. They may also prefer not to cross-subsidize 
poorer, sicker people through public spending. High-income voters may therefore prefer a 
lower level of public health spending, especially when they have the option of private health 
insurance, and this will move the median voter demand down. Evidence for this has been 
found for OECD countries (Tuohy, Flood et al. 2004). Permitting some private purchases of 
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health care does enhance aggregate societal welfare but also increases inequity in its 
distribution.  
Re-election possibility in general has been shown to affect economic policy choices (Besley 
and Case 1993), and the distribution of voter incomes and the expected change in voter 
support from varying levels of public provision affects the allocation of government 
expenditure (Tridimas 2001). There is evidence that taxes are spatially dependent (Besley and 
Case 1992); an important possible explanation is the competitive pressures that local and 
national governments face from mobile household that ‘vote with their feet’ (Tiebout 1956). 
Generalizing this insight suggests that governments may feel some competitive pressure to 
provide health services in line with those available in neighbouring countries. 
The voting model: Women’s suffrage and child survival 
Women’s choices appear to differ systematically 
from those of men, and emphasize child welfare 
more than those of men. Miller (2008) presents 
evidence on how suffrage rights for American 
women enacted between 1869 and 1920 helped 
children to benefit from the scientific 
breakthroughs of the bacteriological revolution. 
Consistent with standard models of electoral 
competition, the extensions of suffrage laws were 
followed by immediate shifts in legislative 
behaviour and increases in local public health 
spending by about 35%. This spending growth 
fuelled large-scale door-to-door hygiene 
campaigns, and child mortality declined by 8–15% 
(or 20,000 annual child deaths nationwide) as 
cause-specific reductions occurred exclusively 
among infectious childhood killers sensitive to 
hygienic conditions. 
Miller, Grant. Women’s suffrage, political responsiveness, and child survival in American history. The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 123(3) p. 1287, 2008 
Image source: http://college.cengage.com/history/primary_sources/us/give_mother_the_vote.htm 
The determinants of government responsiveness to voters are important in this context, and 
having a more informed and politically active electorate strengthens incentives for 
governments to be responsive. This suggests that there is a role for both democratic 
institutions and mass media in ensuring that the preferences of voters are reflected in policy. 
Besley and Burgess (2002) show that Indian state governments are more responsive to falls 
in food production and crop flood damage via public food distribution and calamity relief 
expenditure where newspaper circulation is higher and electoral accountability greater.  
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In recent years, a literature on public involvement in decision making has developed 
(Edwards and Elwyn 2009), (Price 2009) and with applications to patient and public 
involvement in healthcare, and also involving online media (Price 2009). The discussion over 
whether community preferences have a legitimate role to play in priority setting has been 
highly polarised, and about how such involvement can be achieved (Lenaghan 1999). 
Sceptics warn of the risk of establishing a ‘dictatorship of the uninformed’, while advocates 
proclaim the legitimacy of the participatory process. Empirical evidence on how members of 
the general public choose to prioritise health services and treatments has revealed that acute 
interventions receive greater priority, whereas preventative measures, such as family planning 
or education, and care for people with chronic illnesses and disabilities receive lower priority 
(Lenaghan 1999, Wiseman, Mooney et al. 2003). In the US, the public consultation exercises 
of the Oregon health commission found that the highest ranking priorities were treatments 
for life threatening conditions, maternity care and palliative care (Hasnain and Garland 1990, 
Brown 1991).  
Patient involvement: Health and social care personal budgets in the English NHS 
The Integrated Personal Commissioning Programme will be piloted in England from April 
2015. People with complex care needs will be given the chance to control a merged NHS 
and social care personal budget to purchase support. Councils and local NHS services will 
offer people a combined health and social care ‘endowment’ based on each individual’s 
assessed annual care needs. Local areas will be invited to bid to pilot the scheme in 2015-16. 
People who take up the personal budget option will decide how much personal control to 
take over commissioning services to meet their needs. Voluntary sector organisations will be 
commissioned locally to support people’s care planning and provide ‘brokerage’ and 
advocacy. 
http://www.personalhealthbudgets.england.nhs.uk/Topics/Toolkit/MakingPHBshappen/Integrating/ 
Mitton et al. (2009) undertake a scoping review of public participation in health care priority 
setting. They find that governments appear to recognize benefits in consulting multiple 
publics using a range of methods, though more traditional approaches to engagement 
continue to predominate. There appears to be growing interest in deliberative approaches to 
public engagement, which are more commonly on-going rather than one-off and more apt to 
involve face-to-face contact. However, Mitton et al. also find that formal evaluation of 
public engagement efforts is rare, and it is difficult to assess the extent to which public 
involvement is vulnerable to capture by interest groups. Also absent is any real effort to 
demonstrate how public views might be integrated with other decision inputs. 
Bureaucratic decision making 
Models of bureaucratic decision making argue that policy outcomes and resource allocation 
result from a game of bargaining among a small, highly placed group of governmental actors, 
such as ministers, their advisers, and permanent civil servants at national and sub-national 
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governments. Tullock’s (1965) and Niskanen’s (1971) institutional theories focus on the 
interests of ‘bureaucrats’ in maximizing their influence and the effect of their behaviour on 
the level and nature of government output. According to these theories, bureaucrats are akin 
to decision-makers in private firms, with the substitution of budget maximization for the 
profit-maximization motive. The concept of the bureaucrat is interpreted broadly to embrace 
all public sector actors with significant influence over the allocation of resources. The 
essence of this approach is the belief that such bureaucrats receive power and remuneration 
in proportion to the size of their enterprise, with the implication that bloated and inefficient 
public services emerge if there is a lack of effective control on the growth of government. 
Under the bureaucratic model, government agencies will seek to implement policies that 
maximize the size of their own enterprises and to undermine activities that are outside their 
direct control. They are able to do so because they have an informational advantage over 
their political counterparts. ‘Bureaucrats’ may therefore influence the pattern of health care 
expenditures in ways that do not accord with efficiency and equity considerations. If this 
model applies, it would also suggest substantial inertia in spending, making it difficult for 
politicians to change entrenched patterns of services.  
It is difficult to find hard evidence, but the tendency of bureaucrats to maximize their own 
budgets and sphere of influence at the expense of others can be observed across many 
government sectors. For example, bureaucrats in health ministries often find it difficult to 
persuade bureaucrats in other ministries, such as education or social care, to adopt policies 
designed to improve health, because of the reluctance of each sector to relinquish control 
and share budgets. Health care and public health interventions, perhaps more than other 
government activities, requires collaboration across sectors and cross-departmental actions 
for which responsibilities cannot be clearly delineated.  
Hsiao (2007) used the decision choices facing China’s health reform to illustrate the 
importance of political economic analysis and argues for more integrated political economy 
studies, particularly ones examining the roles of the health bureaucracy and the medical 
profession. Hsiao commented that in China, there is a dissonance of goals between the top 
political leaders who wish to address the social unrest by providing effective basic health 
services to everyone, and the agents (the bureaucracy) who wish to pursue their own 
bureaucratic interest, in particular to increase bureaucratic power through larger budgets, 
larger workforces, and greater regulatory power. 
Lipsky’s concept of ‘street-level bureaucracy’ (Lipsky 1979) has been found to be particularly 
pertinent in healthcare because of information asymmetries and the complexity of the 
clinical management of patients (Rothstein 1998). Lipsky (1979) termed public workers 
‘Street-level Bureaucrats’ if they interact directly with citizens in the course of their work and 
have substantial discretion in their treatment of their clients. They generally work in 
conditions that are not conducive to the adequate performance of their jobs, facing high 
demand for their services but lacking the organisational and personal resources necessary to 
do the job well; and they routinely make difficult resource allocation decisions about who 
gets services or not. They must have discretion in taking decisions that allow them to 
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respond effectively to variable client needs, and the high demand for their services forces 
them to develop informal routines for mass processing of patients. On the other hand, the 
considerable degree of discretion accorded to health care workers in determining the nature, 
amount, and quality of services provided by their agencies has a powerful impact on the 
rationing of resources, and the factors governing their decisions might not be based on cost-
effectiveness or similar principles. Providers have considerable influence on resource 
allocation decisions made at the lowest administrative level, therefore changing such 
resource allocation requires improving implementation by dealing with street-level 
bureaucracy. Clearly, given the importance and considerable autonomy of many front-line 
professionals in delivering health services, the notion of a ‘street-level’ bureaucrat has a high 
degree of relevance in the health sector. 
Bureaucratic decision making: Cleaning up the Plague 
The outbreak of the plague in the 2.2 million 
Indian city of Surat in 1994 was largely 
attributed to the high proportion of the city’ 
population that lived in slum dwellings with 
poor sanitation and ineffective waste 
disposal. A little know civil servant 
Suryadevra Ramchandra Rao was appointed 
head of Surat's municipal corporation in 
1995. Rao, a psychology graduate, initiated a 
program to improve waste disposal and slum 
conditions, and introduced ‘AC to DC’: go 
from air-conditioned offices to daily chores. 
Heads of municipal divisions were required 
to spend about half the day on walkabouts, 
to keep track of problems with basic services 
and pipe repairs, manage performance more 
effectively, and importantly, according to 
Rao, to help them appreciate the hard work 
of city employees. Self-esteem among the 
15,000 demoralized city employees increased considerably. Where before the outbreak only 
40% of the daily garbage was cleared, the figure was close to 97% a few years later. 
Morbidity due to infectious diseases fell by 65% within two-and-a-half years.  
http://www.outlookindia.com/article/Cleaning-Up-The-Plague-City/202600 
http://edition.cnn.com/ASIANOW/asiaweek/features/asiacities/ac1999/data/improved.surat.html 
Image source: http://www.virginmedia.com/science-nature/amazing-bodies/outbreak-history-of-
epidemics.php?ssid=10 
A few studies investigate the impact of street-level bureaucrats on the implementation of 
national health policies in low-income countries, for example a change in national health 
policy in South Africa after 1996 (Walker and Gilson 2004) and implementation of a basic 
package of health services in post-conflict Liberia (Petit, Sondorp et al. 2013). Both studies 
found that street-level bureaucrats’ views and values inform their implementation of the 
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health policy, and that failures in implementation are related to exclusion of bureaucrats 
from the process of policy change, and insufficient incorporation of social, financial and 
human resources into the policy implementation process. To overcome these problems, 
Walker and Gilson (2004) and Petit et al. (2013) suggests that policy makers should improve 
planning and management in ways that demonstrate respect and trust for street-level 
bureaucrats. These suggestions rest on the (contestable) assumption that bureaucratic 
motivation is not fixed, but can be modified by deliberate policies.  
Political Institutions and Fiscal Federalism 
Models of political economy tend to focus attention on the influence of individuals or small 
groups on resource allocation. It is important to recognize, however, that the behaviour of 
policy makers, bureaucrats, interest groups and voters are often affected by the institutional 
context in which they operate (Tuohy and Glied 2011). Immergut (1992) argued that in 
order to understand the politics surrounding the introduction of national health insurance, 
we must look beyond the clash of ideologies and the clash of interest groups to the political 
context in which these interests are defined. Theoretical and empirical economic studies 
have explored the role of institutional differences in explaining cross-national and in-country 
variations in health policies, resource allocation and health system characteristics.  
Some of the studies discussed in this section can perhaps not strictly be classified as models 
of political economy, but rather as economic analyses of political decision-making processes. 
However, they share a common objective, to explain why resource allocations may diverge 
from interventions that are considered welfare improving. They further analyse which 
particular features of institutional systems may foster implementation of beneficial 
interventions. The fundamental contrast typically made in this regard is between 
parliamentary systems, which strengthen the executive, and congressional systems marked by 
separation of powers that provide more opportunities for interest groups to influence and 
veto decisions (Tuohy and Glied 2011). For example, research has shown how the 
establishment of strong executives in parliamentary systems of France and UK after the 2nd 
World War enabled the countries to impose controls on doctors and hospital and the 
establishment of the National Health Service that had been impossible under previous 
constitutional regimes (Wilsford 1991, Hacker 1998). On the other hand, the separation-of-
powers of the congressional model in the US has obstructed attempts to adopt national 
health insurance over many decades (Steinmo and Watts 1995). Concentration of authority 
has downsides; it could make government actors risk averse because it also concentrates 
accountability, thus making it difficult for governments to spread the blame for unpopular 
decisions, and it may shift opposition to the implementation rather than the legislative phase 
of policy making (Tuohy and Glied 2011).  
Decentralization 
Most healthcare systems make extensive use of subsidiary levels of government, and many 
resource allocation decisions are made at those levels. It is therefore important to understand 
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how devolution of decision-making influences implementation of welfare-enhancing 
interventions. There is a substantial economic literature on how fiscal federalism (or 
decentralization) affects provision of public services, although less research has focused 
directly on health care services (Petretto 2000). The principle underlying local government is 
that for some kinds of public goods, the benefits accrue to local residents, and there is 
therefore a presumption that – at least up to a point – local people should determine their 
nature. Multiple levels of governance add complexities that affect variations in spending on 
public health and provide multiple access for interests group (Tuohy and Glied 2011), 
although the direction and magnitude of effects is likely to depend on specific funding 
arrangements for such policies. A system under which sub-national governments make 
policy decisions but a significant share of the associated costs is covered by the national 
government may generate moral hazard, leading to health spending in excess of efficient 
levels.  
In contrast, a system where national governments provide a fixed payment to sub-national 
governments which then pay the full marginal cost of services (e.g. Canada for primary and 
secondary care, and Australia for secondary care) may lead to underfunding at the sub-
national level. Further, decentralization may lead to a system of dispersed facilities that fails 
to secure the economies of scale and scope offered by more concentrated patterns of 
infrastructure (Levaggi and Smith 2003). There may also be under-provision of public goods 
such as medical training or research because jurisdictions seek to free-ride on the efforts of 
others. Numerous other theoretical effects of decentralization can be predicted, some of 
which serve to improve welfare and others to compromise welfare. For example, 
decentralization could lead to reduction in spending below society’s optimal levels, because 
blame can be shifted to other levels of government. Conversely it could lead to increased 
spending or improved performance as a result of increased horizontal competition between 
devolved governments. The table ‘Economic arguments pro and con decentralization’ lists 
some of the economic arguments that tend to support decentralization of policy making to 
lower levels of government. It also lists arguments against decentralization, some of which 
directly contradict the arguments in favour. The predictions are mostly based on theoretical 
economic models, and it has proved hard to validate them empirically, either in the health 
sector or the broader public services. From the point of view of this paper, the important 
point is that choices about the extent and nature of decentralized decision-making may 
profoundly affect the outcomes of the health system. 
In a theoretical contribution, Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006) study the trade-offs between 
allocation distortions resulting from monopoly power of unregulated and corrupt 
bureaucrats in a centralised delivery system, and the tendency under decentralisation for local 
governments to be captured by local elites. They assume that the central government is 
uninformed about local need and unable to monitor service allocations. Effects of 
decentralisation on service volumes, efficiency and equity are analysed under different 
financing arrangements for local governments. Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006) demonstrate 
that results depend on the method chosen for financing local governments, and they urge 
caution in inferring that greater revenue decentralisation would be welfare enhancing. In a 
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related study, the same authors analyse the effects on accountability in government service 
delivery of decentralizing administration of an antipoverty programme (Bardhan and 
Mookherjee 2005). While governments at both central and local levels are vulnerable to 
antipoor policy biases owing to political capture, centralized delivery systems are additionally 
prone to bureaucratic corruption, owing to problems in monitoring bureaucratic 
performance. The authors conclude that the net effect is unclear. Decentralizing the delivery 
system may improve or deteriorate intraregional targeting, depending on whether it 
promotes cost-effectiveness at low programme scales, or whether central grants to high-
poverty regions shrink, owing to high capture of local governments by local elites in such 
regions.  
Empirical evidence on the effects of decentralization is scant and difficult to compare, 
because results are likely to depend upon many other factors, including the institutional 
structure at each governmental level. A study of the Spanish national health system found 
evidence that vertical competition had significant impacts for policy innovation and welfare 
state development (Costa-Font and Rico 2006).  
Despite uncertainty about the overall societal benefits of decentralization, many developing 
countries are experimenting with devolution of public service delivery to elected local 
governments instead of bureaucrats appointed by a central government. Lower infant 
mortality rates were found to be associated with higher fiscal decentralization for a panel of 
high and low-income countries (Robalino, Picazo et al. 2001). The authors suggest that fiscal 
decentralization can improve implementation of health improving policies in poor countries, 
and that positive effects increase in institutional environments that promote political rights, 
and decrease in environments with high levels of ethno-linguistic fractionalization. They 
further speculate that fiscal decentralization may improve health outcomes in environments 
with high levels of corruption. This is confirmed by a study in Brazil, which found that 
infant mortality decreased with a greater proportion of ambulatory care facilities directly 
under control of the municipal government (Guanais and Macinko 2009). However the 
authors recommend that introduction of decentralization should be gradual until 
municipalities gain the skills to manage care independently.  
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Economic arguments pro and con decentralization 
Arguments pro decentralization Arguments con decentralization 
Information Remote national governments 
cannot understand all the 
opportunities and constraints that 
affect the supply of local services. 
Information Information asymmetry between 
locality and centre may lead to 
worse outcomes under 
decentralization, if local 
governments act strategically in an 
effort to secure more than their fair 
share of central resources 
Preferences Local governments can respond to 
local preferences and seek to 
design services that reflect local 
priorities. 
Economies of 
scale 
There may be higher production, 
purchasing or managerial costs 
associated with decentralization. 
Local co-
ordination 
Health care requires local co-
ordination of a variety of statutory 
and voluntary agencies. 
Transaction costs Decentralization may impose higher 
burdens in terms of information 
flows or the need for local 
managerial expertise to design and 
monitor local contracts 
Efficiency Local managerial boards may be 
able to identify and root out 
sources of inefficiency because 
they are closer to local institutions 
and citizens 
Spillovers Local governments may be inter-
dependent if services provided by 
one jurisdiction affect citizens from 
another (e.g. vaccinations). 
Accountability: Those who (individually or 
collectively) benefit from a good 
or service should bear the financial 
consequences. 
Macroeconomy The actions of local governments 
may collectively create important 
adverse macroeconomic effects. 
Equity Local governments may be better 
placed than national governments 
to ensure that resources are 
allocated equitably within their 
borders. 
Equity Sub-national variations services, 
standards, taxes, user charges and 
outcomes may compromise 
important equity objectives held at 
a national level 
Innovation Autonomous local governments 
may be more willing and able to 
experiment with new modes of 
delivery. 
Competition Autonomous local governments 
may effectively compete with each 
other to provide efficient and 
effective services (‘yardstick 
competition’) 
Competition Local areas may perversely have an 
incentive to perform poorly on 
certain types of chronic care to 
deter potentially expensive patients 
from settling in their locality. 
Source: Levaggi R, Smith PC. Decentralization in health care: lessons from public economics. In: Smith, P., Ginnelly, 
L. and Sculpher, M. (eds) (2005), Health policy and economics: opportunities and challenges, Maidenhead: Open 
University Press. 
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Contracting out of service provision to non-governmental organizations 
The contracting out of service provision to non-governmental non-profit organizations 
(NGO) can be interpreted as a specific form of decentralization in low-income countries 
(Loevinsohn and Harding 2005, Palmer, Strong et al. 2006). It is increasingly being 
promoted in fragile states - countries affected by conflict, emerging from conflict, or 
otherwise lacking the will or capacity to implement pro-poor policies. In some 
circumstances, contracting out to NGOs has been shown to be an effective way to expand 
services quickly to poor population subgroups. Contracting out is likely to influence resource 
allocation in country, because NGOs will have discretion on how their funds are spent. 
There is however very little research on whether decisions by NGOs are in any sense 
optimal, and how they compare with decisions made by national and local governments.  
In a pilot project in Cambodia, NGOs were contracted to provide district health services on 
behalf of the government (Palmer, Strong et al. 2006). An extensive evaluation showed that 
districts with health services that were contracted out to NGOs delivered care more 
efficiently and equitably than those that remained under government control. It has been 
shown that provision of a package of basic services by contractors costs between roughly 
US$3 and US$6 per head per year in low-income countries (Loevinsohn and Harding 2005). 
Decentralization: Contracting out of health service provision in Afghanistan 
A collaboration of the Ministry of Public Health 
and US agencies is funding contracts with 
NGOs to provide a standardised package of 
care in all Afghan provinces. NGOs can bid for 
contracts that last up to 36 months. Three 
provinces are run under contract to the Ministry 
of Public Health itself—in a scheme known as 
the strengthening mechanism, which is funded 
by the World Bank. The same services are 
delivered but using existing government 
mechanisms. There are now 27 NGOs with contracts, 17 international and 10 Afghan, and 
they include Save the Children, the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan, HealthNet 
International, the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee, the Aga Khan Development 
Foundation and Ibn Sina, a large Afghan NGO. Since the scheme started, many new Afghan 
NGOs have been established. 
Palmer N, Strong L, Wali A, Sondorp E. Contracting out health services in fragile states. British Medical Journal, 
Vol. 332(7): 718-21, 2006. (also source of image) 
NGOs may be less vulnerable to capture by local interest groups than national or local 
governments, and are therefore in a stronger position to implement policies that satisfy 
universal cost-effectiveness criteria but are unpopular with influential elites. NGOs are often 
more flexible than government in their ability to recruit new staff and set up services rapidly. 
In addition, some NGOs have the financial and logistical backing of large international 
organisations and they may supplement contract funds with their own resources. 
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International organizations often prefer to channel funds through NGOs rather than 
through government agencies that are perceived as corrupt and inefficient (Doyle and Patel 
2008). Lastly, the motivation of NGOs is generally expected to be closer to that of public 
providers than that of the for-profit private sector, resulting in greater innovation and staff 
morale. Of course, the downside to such autonomy is that governments with weak capacity 
to deliver services may also be weak in a stewardship and monitoring role, and this in turn 
may result in misalignment of the policies implemented by the NGO and national 
preferences. Further, contracting to different NGOs may fragment the health system and 
continued reliance on external support may delay development of independent national 
public service provision. Doyle and Patei (2008) discuss several concerns about the rising 
influence of NGOs, including that the promotion of NGOs may destabilize democracy 
within countries, that the NGOs legitimacy may be undermined by their own lack of 
accountability and transparency, and a sometimes opaque relationship between global 
organizations and local NGOs.  
Models of political economy and economic priority setting tools 
The purpose of this paper is to highlight from an economic perspective the important 
influence that political forces may have on policy making and priority setting in publicly 
funded health services. It seeks to explain why the predictions and recommendations of 
conventional economic analysis – most importantly cost-effectiveness analysis – may 
apparently be ignored, in favour of actions that do not appear to be in any sense welfare-
maximizing. Most normative economic analysis continues to seek to optimize simple welfare 
functions (usually based on health and equity objectives). There are many reasons why this 
should continue, not least because it indicates the opportunity costs of failing to optimize 
apparently beneficial policies. However there has also been some recognition that 
conventional CEA does not reflect all of the decision-makers’ concerns, and that there is a 
need to adapt such normative models to reflect the political realities of decision-making. 
This section briefly sketches some of the approaches that have been proposed. 
The neoclassical economic model is built on the presumption that there is only individual 
rationality and all interaction is instrumental; in this situation the market is the only relevant 
form of exchange. Institutional economics, on the other hand, acknowledges that what is 
considered rational is institutionally dependent and hence there exist distinct types of 
rationality. The concept of social, cooperative or reciprocal rationality is distinct from 
individual rationality; it is the propensity to respond positively to sympathetic actions and 
negatively to apathetic behaviour, despite individual losses from such a response. There is 
evidence for such rationality in the health care sector; most countries incorporate 
considerations of equity into resource allocation decisions even if it implies a departure from 
the utility maximization principle that is underlying the traditional economic theory of 
decision-making. If reciprocal rationality influences decision making, then alternative forms 
of exchange to markets need to be found to negotiate resource allocation (Vatn 2007). The 
concept of deliberative institutions is one such alternative form of exchange (Smith 2000). It 
acknowledges that the ideal solution is the consensus, which is based on coercion free 
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communication and evaluation of arguments. Through communication and learning 
individuals change preferences and positions so that agreement on what solution to prioritize 
can be reached. Vatn (2007) suggests that in order to find a solution to the decision making 
problem that incorporates political relations, societies have to choose an institutional 
structure that is consistent with the problems faced, and that strikes a balance between 
individual and social rationality. 
CEA analysis and associated economic tools rest on the assumption that rationality is 
welfare-maximizing and that a decision problem has an optimal solution. It also assumes that 
individual preferences are stable and can be aggregated, that values are commensurable (all 
values can be transformed into the same measurement scale) and compensable (a loss in one 
attribute can be compensated by a gain in another). In response to these somewhat 
unrealistic assumptions, health economics has developed priority-setting tools that aim to 
foster discourse-based resource allocation. They can be complementary to the more 
traditional economic models, for example, the recommendations of CEA may feed into the 
decision problem as one of the criteria (see the example). Multi-criteria decision analysis 
(MCA) acknowledges that goods are multidimensional and decisions are complex, and 
further that attributes are often incommensurability and non-compensability, i.e. they are not 
easily transferred into one dimension and often trading-off one attribute against the other 
may not be possible. MCA is focused on conflict resolution, i.e. finding a compromise 
between conflicting interests.  
Programme budgeting and marginal analysis (PBMA) is a priority setting tool that aims to 
resolve competing claims through presentation of evidence and involvement of key 
stakeholders (Donaldson and Mitton 2009). It consists of two components. First, 
programme budgeting reveals the current activities and associated expenditures, and may 
help to reveal areas that should be given more attention, and to enable comparisons with 
other regions where possible. Subsequently, in marginal analysis, an advisory panel is tasked 
with identifying new services for investment or existing services that should receive more 
funds, and services for disinvestment. Investment and disinvestment lists are compiled 
where all services are ranked according to pre-defined criteria.  
PBMA can be used at a micro level (within programmes of care), at a meso level (across 
services within the same area of care) or at a macro level (across all programme areas within 
a single health organization). The advisory panel should be representative of the organization 
or the area under interest and contain an optimum number of members. In practice, the 
panel may comprise managers, clinicians, programme administrators, data and financial 
personnel, and patients or members of the public. PBMA is used as a systematic approach to 
improve governmental priority-setting in health (Mitton, Patten et al. 2005, Donaldson and 
Mitton 2009), albeit mainly in high-income countries. Tsourapas and Frew (2011) conducted 
a systematic literature review to evaluate applications of PBMA, using four alternative 
definitions of ‘success’. They found that PBMA was successful in 52% of cases when success 
was defined in terms of the participants gaining a better understanding of the area under 
interest; in 65% of cases when success was defined as 'implementation of all or some of the 
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advisory panel's recommendations'; in 48% of the studies when success was defined in terms 
of disinvesting or resource reallocation; and in 22% when success was defined in terms of 
adopting the framework for future use. 
Institutions: Multi-criteria decision analysis for priority setting in Ghana 
Baltussen et al. (2006) used MCA to rank order the relative importance of criteria to priority 
setting in health in Ghana Respondents chose between 12 pairs of scenarios that described 
interventions in terms of medical and non-medical criteria. Subsequently, a composite league 
table was constructed to rank order a set of interventions by mapping interventions on those 
criteria and considering the relative weights of different criteria. They find that interventions 
that are cost-effective, reduce poverty, target severe diseases, or target the young had a 
higher probability of being chosen than others.  
The composite league table showed that high priority interventions in Ghana are prevention 
of mother to child transmission in HIV/AIDS control, and treatment of pneumonia and 
diarrhoea in childhood. Low priority interventions are certain interventions to control blood 
pressure, tobacco and alcohol abuse. Baltussen et al. found that the composite league table 
lead to a different and more differentiated rank ordering of interventions compared to pure 
efficiency ratings.  
Baltussen R, E Stolk, D Chisholm and M Aikins (2006). "Towards a multi-criteria approach for priority setting: an 
application to Ghana." Health Economics 15(7): 689-696. (also source of image) 
Disinvestment from ineffective treatment remains a challenge, despite increasing awareness 
even among the medical profession (Kmietowicz 2006, Elshaug, Hiller et al. 2007). For 
example, a proposal to advise on abandoning ineffective interventions using financial 
rewards and penalties was suggested (but not implemented) in the UK by the chief medical 
officer, Liam Donaldson, in his 2005 annual report (DoH 2005). In his report Donaldson 
highlighted the fact that unnecessary tonsillectomies and hysterectomies cost the NHS £21m 
($40m) a year, despite other treatment options being available. Perversely, challenges to 
disinvestment may sometimes be related to a lack of resources to support disinvestment 
policy mechanisms (Elshaug, Hiller et al. 2007). In 2006, the Department of Health 
announced a new mandate for NICE to help the NHS identify interventions that are not 
effective. Pearson (2007) discusses NICE efforts to support value in the NHS and then 
explores the policy options available to the Institute to meet the NHS request for guidance 
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on disinvestment. In particular, NICE has invested in the development of Clinical 
Guidelines and Quality Standards that explicitly aim to reduce inappropriate use of expensive 
procedures, and aims to improve implementation by developing NICE Pathways as practical 
online resources for practitioners. The website currently lists a total of 219 published NICE 
guidelines (NICE 2014). Similarly, in 2006 the World Health Organization established the 
Committee on the Use of Research Evidence (SURE) to improve the use of research 
evidence, including guidelines (Oxman, Fretheim et al. 2006). Insufficient implementation of 
guidelines is a concern, and there is not much research on the organizational and personal 
characteristics related to the health professionals that affect the implementation of guidelines 
(Francke, Smit et al. 2008).  
Conclusions 
This paper has discussed the various ways in which political considerations can impinge on 
the decisions made by those setting priorities for the health system. Many of those political 
influences are legitimate and virtuous, in the sense that they reflect the need to allow a range 
of voices to be heard in the priority-setting process. However, some of the political 
influences are malign, and may serve to undermine the principles of good priority setting, 
which might include transparency, consistency, efficiency and equity. In particular, such 
influences may lead to serious departures from the principles underlying priority-setting tools 
such as cost-effectiveness analysis.  
The paper has indicated that many political constraints arise from the power held by 
important groups within the health system, such as clinical professionals, provider 
organizations, patient groups, and pharmaceutical companies. The main way in which such 
power can be limited and channelled to good purpose is through the implementation of 
good governance mechanisms that hold the powerful to account. These might include 
independent scrutiny, transparent performance reporting, and well-functioning electoral 
systems and provider markets. Without good governance it is difficult to see how adverse 
political constraints can be avoided.  
The promotion of equity in health and health care can in some respects be viewed as a 
political constraint. Hauck et al. (2002) note the confused nature of debates about fairness in 
the health sector, and set out seven concepts of fairness commonly used in those debates. 
Some of the concepts can readily be incorporated into conventional CEA, for example by 
placing greater weight on health gains for disadvantaged population groups. However, the 
nature of equity criteria adopted in health policy is likely to vary between health systems, and 
so it will be difficult to develop universal ‘equity-weighted’ measures of cost-effectiveness 
(Asaria, Griffin et al. 2013). It is also important to note that the adoption of certain equity 
criteria can act as a constraint on adopting some technologies. For example, a health system 
may determine that if a treatment adopted in its benefit package, it must be made available to 
all who demand it, regardless of their circumstances. This may preclude adoption of a 
treatment that is cost-effective only for a subgroup of the population. For example, certain 
types of joint replacement may be cost-effective only for those below a certain age. 
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However, an equity requirement that discrimination on the grounds of age is prohibited may 
mean that the CEA can be assessed only with respect to the entire population, and not just 
with respect to the younger age group. Application to the entire population may render the 
treatment unacceptable from a cost-effectiveness perspective, and so the equity constraint 
means it cannot be included in the benefits package. 
Priority setting is ultimately a political undertaking. To some extent, the health technology 
assessment agencies now being put in place across the world are an indication that politicians 
feel it is helpful and expedient to devolve some aspects of that process to agencies with 
politically determined terms of reference. At its best, this approach can lead to better 
informed rankings of treatments, made on a consistent basis, aligned with social preferences. 
However, the technical recommendations of those agencies must almost always be viewed 
from a broader perspective than that of narrowly defined CEA. In some cases that broader 
scrutiny may be undertaken within the agency (as in NICE), in others it must be left to those 
who are ultimately accountable for choosing priorities. In either case, a key consideration will 
be the political context within which the decision is being made. 
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